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I. Introduction
The spread of the recent financial crisis from the United States to Europe and shows the
breadth and depth of globalization in financial markets. As the as crisis has deepened and
persisted in Europe, some national governments have fallen under tremendous fiscal strain. The
resulting poor sovereign credit ratings and high interest rates on government bonds have
challenged these countries while the European Union as a whole works to stave off sovereign
defaults and recapitalize banks. Spain is one such country facing economic recession and tight
government financing constraints. Interestingly, Spain today has a smaller debt-to-GDP ratio
than the United States, yet suffers record high yields on their bonds while the U.S. continues
paying lenders comparatively low yields (Amaral and Jacobsen, 2011).
If the factors directly associated with government credibility such as the debt ratio are
misleading, what are investors considering when they invest in government securities? In Europe,
the financial crisis and threat of a Greek default have left some banks undercapitalized and at risk
of failure. Furthermore, investors have seen large state interventions in support of the financial
sector, as in the case of Ireland in September 2008 (Amaral and Jacobsen, 2011). From these
two considerations, investors may be drawing a connection between banks’ exposures to foreign
claims, their financial vulnerability should those foreign debtors default, and state commitments
to bolster banks through deficit spending to guarantee bank deposits and inject capital in an effort
to stabilize the industry.
While there has been a great deal of investigation into sovereign credit ratings, yields, and
yield spreads, particularly in the European Union and among developing nations, none have
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explicitly considered banking sectors’ foreign exposures. This paper will seek to test the
hypothesis that the foreign claims of euro zone commercial banking sectors affect their
governments’ bond yields. In so doing, I will next review the relevant literature to contextualize
my investigation and identify influences on my theory. The subsequent section will present a
theoretical conceptualization of the relationship between bond prices and government bond
yields. The fourth section will present information on summary statistics from a sample of 11
euro zone countries. Sections 5 and 6 will encompass the results and robustness checks of the
analysis and the final section will discuss the conclusions of the investigation.
II. Review of Literature on Bond Yield Spreads
The empirical literature has generally established three overarching factors in the
determination of yield spreads: a country’s credit risk, investors’ general risk aversion, and asset
liquidity.
A credit risk factor is any factor that directly affects a government’s ability to service its
debts. Most studies of bond yield spreads agree that the ratios of debt and deficit-to-GDP are
significant predictors of yield spread. Cantor and Parker (1996) used cross-sectional data on 49
countries from 1995 and they noted that the variables used by ratings agencies to assign
sovereign credit ratings would also be predictive of yield spreads. They found GDP growth,
inflation, per capita income, external debt indicators of default history and economic
development to be significant explanatory variables for yield spreads. 1 In the euro zone,
however, many researchers have found deficit and debt alone account for sufficient variance in
bond yield spreads and are the most important credibility factors in determining risk premia and
hence bond yield spreads (Attinasi et al, 2009; Broos and de Haan, 2012; von Hagen et al, 2011).
Two serious limitations of their study were that by including agency credit rating directly, the significance of other
variables may have been masked and their data was only cross-sectional and traced no evolution in spreads through time.
1
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Investigators have also recently considered aggregate national banking assets and
banking equity to assets as credibility factors in the determining yield spreads. Gerlach et al
found when debt and deficit increase, countries with large banking sectors and low equity ratios
experience a greater yield spread as investors envision bank rescues financed by state deficit
spending (2010). Other research has found higher equity levels in particular have a significant
negative effect on spreads in the euro zone (Klepsch and Wollmerhäuser, 2011). The argument
for the inclusion of variables for these banking statistics stems from the recent financial crisis;
should several major banks fail, states will rescue the industry and the subsequent deficit
spending and higher public debt then lead to a widening in sovereign bond spreads. Some
researchers, while again corroborating the evidence that deficit and debt ratios affect yield
spreads, find that the effect of these variables increases the more the debt issued by a government
is foreign-owned (Broos and de Haan, 2012). Broos and de Haan argue that at high levels of
indebtedness, foreign ownership of the government’s bonds will increase the sensitivity of bond
yields to the debt ratio.
The second theoretical factor influencing yield spreads is general risk aversion. In times
of financial turmoil, investors often turn to relatively safer liquid assets as opposed to long-term
government bonds (Schuknecht et al, 2009). In other words, investors become more risk averse
in times of financial turmoil, which requires countries to raise yields to sell their bonds. Many
studies use indicators of financial conditions in the United States financial markets to measure
general risk aversion and find they have significant impacts on bond yield spreads. Codogno et
al (2003) and Attinasi et al (2009) find the spread between the yields on Moody’s Seasoned
AAA U.S. corporate bonds and 10-year U.S. government bonds have a significant positive
impact on yield differentials between euro zone government bonds. Schuknecht et al (2009) use
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the same measure, but with BBB bonds instead and also find it significant. Recently, Klepsch
and Wollmerhäuser (2011) implemented the VIX index, which measures the volatility of the
U.S. equity market, as a proxy variable for risk aversion. They argue this indicator reflects best
the increase in investing risk and aversion due to the 2008 financial crisis and found this measure
to have a significant and positive effect before and especially after the financial crisis.
Much investigation has explored the role of liquidity in bond markets, the third
theoretical factor influencing yield spreads. In liquid markets, investors face low transaction
costs and may trade their assets frequently. As liquidity decreases, investors will demand a
compensation for the risk of being unable to make timely low-cost trades and therefore yields
will climb higher. Some studies represent the relative liquidity of bonds with bid-ask spreads
and the volume of government bonds outstanding and find such variables are as or more
significant than credit factors (Gómez-Puig, 2006; Beber et al, 2009). Codogno et al (2003)
additionally used the trading volume and the raw quantity of bonds available at the bid and ask
prices as proxy indicators of liquidity, where a higher trading volume or market size suggests
greater liquidity and less risk to investors. Codogno et al, however, found none of their
indicators of liquidity to be statistically significant, although trading volume was their strongest
estimator. One explanation for the lack of significant findings in the Codogno et al analysis
could be multicollinearity among these liquidity variables. Overall, the size of government bond
markets (measured by the total amount of sovereign debt issuance as a fraction of all debt issued
in a sample) is a common measure of liquidity which has a significant positive effect on bond
spreads (Bernoth, 2004; Gómez-Puig, 2006; Attinasi et al, 2009).
The influences of liquidity factors and general risk aversion factors are well-established,
as is the effect of the debt and deficit-to-GDP ratio. Less well-understood, are the relationships
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between the banking industry, globalization, and government bond yields. My paper seeks to
expand this knowledge by following the argument of Gerlach et al (2010) and considering the
results of Broos and de Haan (2012). Like Gerlach et al (2010), I expect that the banking sectors
pose risks to national governments and that investors expect governments to rescue or relieve
banks during times of financial crisis (see Gerlach et al, 11). Similar to Broos and de Haan, I
also expect that increased globalization and foreign financing enhance the effects of banking and
credibility risks on bond yields. This investigation aims to expand these two areas of yield
determination research by considering the effect of the banking industries’ foreign claims on the
respective government’s bond yields. This paper will also consider the size of government bond
markets as a measure of liquidity, and its impact on bond spreads. The next section will
illustrate how credibility factors, liquidity, and general risk aversion play a role in the
determination of bond yield spreads.
III. Theory
What determines the yield of bonds is how much investors expect they will earn from the
bond or the yield to maturity.2 The risk of default, the potential costs of making bond
transactions, and the general perceived risk in financial markets decrease this expected bond
yield.
Consider an international capital market of investors and borrowers in which investors
are lenders and sovereign national governments are borrowers. Assume that investors’ goal is to
maximize returns on their investment (loan) while governments intend to sell bonds (borrow)
such that they meet an exogenous financing target. In other words, the amount of securities
2

“The effective interest rate that a bondholder will earn if the bond is held until maturity. Yield-to-maturity takes into
account the bond’s purchase price, its current market price, the coupon rate, which is the interest rate that the bond pays,
and the amount of time remaining until the bond matures. Yield-to-maturity is the most accurate representation of how
much a bond [sic] will actually receive if the bond is held until maturity” (“Yield-to-maturity”).
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issued at any given time is inelastic and only investors’ demand for bonds determines their
market interest rate. Investors demand is solely determined by the probability of receiving the
full yield to maturity of a bond. In an ideal world, all government bonds are identical and
governments will sell all bonds necessary at risk free interest rates to meet a financing goal.
Additionally in this ideal world, investors will expect to receive Y on all government bonds, or
all of what they invest plus the interest earned on that investment.
[1]
Suppose, however, that sovereign government bonds are no longer identical and some are
subject to default risk such that these governments have a probability of default of
where

and

,

is a set of variables affecting the chances of default. Thus the

expected yield on risk bearing country i’s becomes:
[2]
Additionally, the investor knows bonds have some amount of liquidity, , where higher
liquidity implies a higher expected yield for the investor. This is strictly in the sense that the
investor may maximize their returns by approaching the expected yield to maturity should they
trade the bond before maturation. Thus this variable has a positive relationship to yield.
[3]
To consider a yield spread, we compare the yield of a risk-bearing bond to a bond
considered risk free and perfectly liquid. In the euro zone context, German bonds are
traditionally assumed to be the perfectly liquid, risk free bond. The expected return on the risky
bond was presented in equation [3]; the expected return of the risk free bond (German) is as
follows:
[4]
7
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Therefore the difference in the expected return between Germany and country i’s bonds
becomes:
[5]
or after division and substitution,

Now the general risk aversion, , of investors is added, which will positively impact the
expected yields of all financial assets as investors become more pessimistic. In particular, it will
increase the spread in expected yields as German bonds will still be risk free relative to all other
bonds. Lastly, to complete the theoretical equation, I add i and t subscripts to represent the
variables for each country i at time t.

The left-hand side term of the equation expresses the yield differential between the
foreign

and German bond

, or the difference between what the investor would have taken

home by investing in a riskless German versus another foreign bond. The expression
is the yield premium over German securities resulting from default risk. The third
term on the right-hand side reflects the premium on liquidity, and the last term represents the
investors’ general risk aversion. Essentially, for governments to sell their exogenously
determined amount of bonds, they must raise interest rates, r, and thus expected yields, to
compensate for the added risk and lower liquidity of their bonds relative to the benchmark
German bond. In other words, governments must pay the credit risk, liquidity, and risk aversion
premia in the form of higher yields to sell their bonds.
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As the right-hand side parameters of the equation cannot be measured directly, they must
be represented with proxy variables based on empirical work. These parameters are government
fiscal performance or credibility factors, a liquidity factor, and a general risk aversion factor.
Consider domestic banks’ foreign claims, the experimental variable, as one such credibility
factor.
Countries whose banks have a large amount of foreign claims will experience higher
bond yields because there is greater risk of state bank rescues or reliefs. If the economy in a
borrowing country undergoes a drastic contraction, borrowers may default on their loans. The
risk of such an occurrence increases with the number of countries to whom a bank lends
(especially in the case of a recessionary contagion) and with the extent to which each additional
country is economically unreliable. The defaults may be unsustainable for the lending
institutions and they may need government rescue, and therefore the probability that state rescue
packages will be implemented increases. Governments in Europe in the past several years have
been willing to rescue banks, which increases deficit and debt-to-GDP ratios. Investors
financing bank relief measures ultimately view these governments as less capable of servicing
their debt and will not invest unless they are paid a premium for the additional risk with higher
bond yields. Investors may anticipate this risk if they see a nation’s banks more or less heavily
exposed to the risk of default on their foreign loans.
It follows from the literature to include the government deficit-to-GDP ratio and debt-toGDP ratio (debt) as credibility factors in estimating bond yields. For simplification in bringing
the theory to the data, however, I will consider government surplus instead of deficit, where a
negative surplus is a positive deficit. These are direct factors that play into the risk of
government default because a high debt-to-GDP or low surplus-to-GDP ratio (surplus) increases
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the probability that governments will be unable to pay their debts and would therefore increase
bond yields. As in calculating a yield spread, these values will be made relative to Germany by
subtracting the contemporaneous values for all other countries. This measure is more
meaningful in the euro zone context and is closer to what investors likely consider in their choice
to invest. It is important to note that the expected sign for the surplus coefficient in the estimated
equation for yield spread is positive, while for foreign claims and debt the expected sign is
negative. In summary, we have defined the x variables of the theoretical equation as follows.

The remaining factors are liquidity and investors’ general risk aversion. The liquidity
factor will be represented by the aggregate euro value of securities issued by country i at time t
as a fraction of the total value of all bonds issued by countries i and Germany at time t. This is
thought to capture the size and efficiency of the bond market. The more debt in bonds a country
issues, the larger and more efficient its capital markets are, the less costly it will be to trade those
bonds, and therefore the lower the yield spread from Germany will be. As a proxy for general
risk aversion, I will follow the method used by Klepsch and Wollmerhäuser (2011) and use the
VIX, which measures the volatility of the U.S. equity market constructed from call and put
volatilities from S&P 500 index options. 3 The greater the VIX, the greater the volatility in the
U.S. equity market, and the more risk averse investors will be, implying higher government bond
yields. The expected signs of these variables’ coefficients are negative and positive,
respectively.

3

Put and call options refer to stock options wherein the bearer will buy (call option) stock at a certain price or before a
particular date or sell (put option) stock within an agreed time at a specific price.
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As can be observed in the data studied in this paper and in the literature, the 2008
financial crisis brings about a paradigm shift in yield spread estimation. With the collapse of
Lehman Brothers in September of that year and announcements of large state rescues of
endangered financial institutions within the euro zone, yield spreads reached historic highs. To
account for the unique influence of the crisis and subsequent turbulence, I will add a time
dummy for the crisis beginning in the third quarter of 2008 and expect that its coefficient’s sign
will be positive to indicate the increase in bond yield spreads during that period.
With the variables now clarified, the initial spread equation, [7], can be simplified into
the following reduced form guiding equation for OLS estimation.

is the difference in yield between Germany and the i-th country’s bonds at time t, and
is the constant term, and

is the stochastic error term. The next section will describe the data

used for the above variables.
IV. Summary Statistics
To estimate the guiding equation, we need data for each variable in the equation for each
country in the euro zone over the chosen time range and at a synchronized frequency. The
sample I use consists of quarterly observations of these variables from the fourth quarter of 2003
to the third quarter of 2011. The countries represented in the sample are Austria, Belgium,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
At the heart of this investigation are the data representing the aggregate foreign claims of
domestic banks and the domestic credit extended by banks. Together, these two statistics can be
combined in a ratio for a reasonable indicator of the relative amount of foreign exposure
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domestic banking sectors have in the euro zone. This indictor allows for meaningful
comparisons between national banking industries and contains the information that is
hypothesized to influence investors’ investment decisions and therefore bond yields. Ideally,
these data would come at quarterly frequency for all members of the euro zone and claims would
be ultimate risk basis. Ultimate risk basis means that claims are allocated to the country where
the ultimate risk lies if the borrower should default; for instance if a French bank’s loan to
Mexico were guaranteed by a Dutch bank, the loan would be recorded as the Dutch bank’s claim.
The data on foreign claims I used are taken from the Bank for International Settlements
(BIS) Consolidated Banking Statistics and are collected at quarterly intervals and on an ultimate
risk basis. For total foreign claims, the BIS sums banks’ cross-border claims, the local claims of
foreign affiliates of the banks in foreign currency, and local claims of foreign affiliates in local
currency. Regarding domestic claims, the banking survey statistics of the International Financial
Statistics database of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is used. The database collects data
on aggregate commercial banking institutions’ lending to domestic borrowers for most countries
at monthly, quarterly, and annual frequency. There were incomplete data on domestic credit for
some countries in some periods, but generally there were data for the sample countries and
sample time span.
The dependent variable is the government bond yield relative to that of Germany (i.e. the
yield spread relative to ‘riskless’ Germany). Ideally, the yield on 10-year government bonds
would be analyzed following previous studies and as closer representation of the assets investors
see on the market. Fortunately, The IMF’s International Financial Statistics provide these data
for all countries in this sample. Specifically, they record the simple monthly average of daily
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secondary market yields on 10 year government bonds, of which I use the value recorded for the
last month of each quarter.
Data on the credibility statistics “central government surplus-to-GDP” and “public debtto-GDP” are critical to any bond yield investigation. Ideally, quarterly data would be available
for both to match the frequency of the dependent variable yield, but the only data available on
debt-to-GDP were annual. Therefore, these data were linearly interpolated over the time range to
expand the number of observations. Interpolation means interpretation must be made with
caution, but the debt-to-GDP ratio is a control variable and therefore not essential to the
hypothesis. The surplus-to-GDP ratio is taken from the European Central Bank’s (ECB)
Statistical Warehouse, which keeps these data at quarterly and annual frequency for most
European countries. The public debt-to-GDP ratio comes from the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development’s StatExtracts database, and both ratios were made relative to
Germany by subtracting the contemporaneous ratio for German surplus and debt.
Variables for liquidity and general risk aversion are also included in the guiding equation.
These variables would ideally capture the theoretical influence of liquidity premia and any risk
premia on yields derived from general levels of riskiness in financial markets. Although
imperfect, the share of a country’s total bond issuance (in euro) relative to the size of the total
issuance of near substitutes—other countries’ issuances—will capture liquidity risk. Quarterly
data on gross issuances are available from the ECB’s Statistical Warehouse, which I then used to
compute quarterly securities issued ratios. The VIX is an indicator of the volatility in U.S.
equity markets available from the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). It is measured as
the closing price in U.S. dollars on options of the CBOE’s S&P 500 Index fund and is a proxy
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for the general risk level in financial markets. Higher prices indicate greater risk aversion. I
converted these month-end closing prices to quarterly averages.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics, listing each variable and the associated summary
statistics. Of first importance, all variables are converted in percentage point terms for this
analysis. There are 11 countries and 32 time periods (quarters) and therefore should be 352
observations. Germany’s debt-to-GDP and surplus-to-GDP are not reported in the data for the
last three periods of the series, however, causing yield spread to have 33 missing values.
Removing these and several other missing observations, 304 observations were left for analysis.
The extremely high maximum for the foreign to total claims ratio is reasonable because some
countries in the sample have small domestic markets but large globalized financial sectors.
Some countries did not issue any securities in a given period, and therefore the minimum of the
securities issued ratio is zero.
V. Analysis and Main Results
The data constitute a balanced panel with 304 observations, which allows for a wide
variety of analyses. A fixed effects regression is the most appropriate technique for the main
regression. There are many country specific unobserved effects on yield in the euro zone which
this type of regression will control, and in addition, the results of the Hausman Specification Test
confirm this selection. 4 Before moving further, however, I address the main estimation issues
arising in this dataset.
The first two estimation issues I consider are heteroskedasticity and serial correlation,
which if present, would decrease the accuracy of statistical significances. Considering the
appropriate model as a fixed effects regression, I produce a modified Wald statistic calculated for

4

Hausman

statistic was 342.34 with a p-Value of 0.00
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the group of variables, which was unlikely enough that I conclude there is heteroskedasticity. 5
Using the Wooldridge Test for autocorrelation to determine the existence of serial correlation,
the F-statistic of the test was sufficiently improbable that I conclude there is serial correlation in
the data.6 Conveniently, both of these errors are reparable by using robust standard errors, which
are used for the main estimation and robustness checks.
The third estimation I consider is non-stationarity, which if present, would potentially
cause spurious correlation between the dependent and independent variables. This would
invalidate the statistical significances of the coefficients. Using a version of the Dickey-Fuller
Test, I conclude that the yield spread, relative debt-to-GDP, and VIX index are non-stationary.
Furthermore, testing the residuals of the fixed effects regression for stationarity, the result
suggests there is no cointegration among the variables.7 To resolve this issue of potential
spurious correlation, I estimate the equation in first differences (the entire equation for simplicity
of interpretation). After changing the specification to a first difference equation, the nonstationary variables become stationary except for relative debt-to-GDP. I then analyze its second
difference and determine it was stationary. Therefore, the guiding equation becomes the
following.

The last estimation issue I investigate is multicollinearity, which could again result in
inaccurate hypothesis testing and statistical significance. The correlation coefficients suggest

5

The Wald
test statistic (p-Value) was 2409.40 (0.00).
The Wooldridge F statistic (p-Value) was 938.540 (0.00).
7
The Fisher
test statistics (p-Values) for yield spread, relative debt-to-GDP, VIX index, and the residuals were 12.69
(0.94), 10.87 (0.98), and 22.19 (0.45), and 25.76 (0.26), respectively.
6
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that only the VIX index and Crisis dummy are severely correlated. 8 Calculating variance
inflation factors, the factors for the VIX index and Crisis dummy were only about two for each.
Therefore multicollinearity is a moderate estimation issue in this analysis, but both variables will
remain in the main estimation as guided by theory.
Accounting for estimation issues, the main regression is performed following equation
above.9 Table 2 presents the results of this regression. As presented in the table, the
number of observations used in the estimation is smaller than that in the sample. This is because
the calculation of first and second differences necessarily causes the loss of the first observations
in each variable’s time series.
The results show that the coefficient on the Foreign Claims to Total Ratio is negative and
not statistically significant. This is surprising in two ways: one, I expect foreign claims to have a
significant effect on bond yield spreads, and two, I expect a positive sign. A negative sign
suggests that increases in the amount of foreign claims a country has actually decreases the
difference between that country’s bond yields and those of Germany. One explanation for this
negative relationship is that, investors may see large amounts foreign claims as a sign banks have
diversified their lending and therefore risk. If the particular banking industry’s host country or
any particular foreign country goes through a severe economic contraction and borrowers default
on their loans, the banks will still have a large amount of secure claims and can cover their
losses. This line of reasoning could be investigated in further research.
Relative Debt-to-GDP, the VIX Index, and the Crisis Dummy, are all significant
variables at the 10-percent level with signs congruent with theory. An increase of one
percentage point in relative debt-to-GDP during two previous quarters correlates to an increase
8

The correlation coefficient was 0.72. The variance inflation factors for the VIX index and Crisis dummy were 2.10 and
2.20, respectively.
9
Using the xtregar command in Stata, 11th edition.
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in the yield spread of approximately 0.06 percentage points during the first previous quarter.
This coefficient is moderately economically significant considering the standard deviation of
yield spreads presented in Table 1. The crisis dummy is additionally economically significant
and the VIX index is of marginal economic significance in this regression, both with positive
signs. Lastly, neither the relative surplus-to-deficit or securities issued ratios were significant, as
I would expect from the theory. Moreover, the sign of the coefficient on the securities issued
ratio is positive, contrary to what theory suggests. One possible explanation is that, given the
time range of the sample, several euro zone countries with low levels of credibility factors
increased their debt issuance in an attempt to refinance their governments and take fiscal policy
measures to stimulate their economies. Thus larger securities issued ratios come from countries
with a higher yield spread than would be expected in normal economic times and the correlation
is positive. The following section will present robustness checks to verify conclusions from the
main results.
VI. Robustness Analyses
In this section several variations of estimations of bond yield spread are conducted to
substantiate the conclusions of the main results. Table 3 presents the results of the first
robustness check, in which the main regression is repeated, but without the crisis dummy
variable. These results show that this alteration of equation [12] has almost no effect on the
estimated coefficients except that the constant becomes significant. This is reasonable given that
the crisis dummy variable had been explaining the drastic shift in bond yield spreads after
September 2008, and with the removal of the crisis dummy, that variance is likely attributed to
the constant term.
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Table 4 presents several robustness checks using a robust fixed effects regression, which
uses the within variance of the variables for estimation. By using this regression technique,
spurious correlation could be present in the estimation because of non-stationarity in the
variables. Nevertheless, it is all the more useful as a robustness check to corroborate the
evidence from the main regression that the foreign claims ratio is not significant if it is not even
significant because of spurious correlation. Regression (i) shows the main results, while
regression (ii) presents a simple fixed effects estimation of equation [11], the guiding equation
without differencing. Regression (iii) estimates the equation when the bond yield spread is
transformed to its natural log, which might allow a closer fit to the data. Regression (iv) follows
the specification of Broos and de Haan (2012) in including relative surplus and debt-to-GDP
ratios squared. The log of the securities issued ratio is included instead of the standard securities
ratio to attempt to achieve a closer fit to the data. Lastly, regression (v) performs a fixed effects
regression only for a subsample of data before the fourth quarter of 2008, the first peak in yields
from the financial crisis in Europe.
Throughout all of the fixed effects regressions, the foreign claims ratio is insignificant,
which corroborates the results of the main estimation. The relative debt-to-GDP ratio and VIX
index variables are significant and positive in all estimations except the last, which again
matches the main results. Notably in regression (iii) foreign claims does have the hypothesized
positive sign. In regression (iv), both the relative surplus and debt-to-GDP ratios squared
became significant, which suggests a quadratic relationship between them and yield spreads and
underlines the importance of these factors in the determination of yield spreads. The constant
term becomes significant in all of the fixed effects regressions as well, which is especially logical
in the final regression. Before the crisis, yield spreads were relatively small, and therefore one
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constant value can estimate the yield spread accurately. The change to a negative sign for the
constant term in the fixed effects regression is likely explained by the crisis. Since yield spreads
climb dramatically during the end of the sample, when the financial crisis occurred, it is
necessary for the y-intercept to be negative in order for the positively sloping estimation line to
be best-fit. The first difference of yield spread doesn’t exhibit this extremity and therefore the
line can be fit with a positive intercept.
Table 5 presents a random effects estimation and two pooled regressions. These
techniques permit possible spurious correlation, but also provide some insight into the data.
Regression (i) presents the main results of the differenced equation, while regression (ii) is a
random effects regression of equation [11]. This is the first regression to find the foreign claims
ratio as significant and also contrasts with the main results in finding the crisis to be
insignificant. The change in the significance of the crisis dummy may be explained by the fact
that a random effects model uses both within and between variance in the estimation of
coefficients. There is likely sufficient variance between countries so as to diminish the crisis
dummy’s explanatory power for yields. Furthermore, when including between country variance,
it appears there is a negative correlation between the foreign claims ratio and bond yields. Not
only does this weaken the conclusions of the main results, but it also implies the hypothesis that
foreign claims increase yields is inaccurate at least in its prediction of the sign of the correlation.
In regression (iii) a pooled regression is used with equation [11] and foreign claims,
relative debt-to-GDP, and the crisis dummy again match the main results, while the relative
surplus-to-GDP and, for the first time, the securities issued ratio, become significant. The
securities issued ratio, however, does not have the expected sign, which may result because
countries with relatively higher debt and deficit levels may have increased their bond issuance
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during the financial crisis in efforts to stabilize and stimulate their economies, while other
ostensibly more austere countries issued no more bonds than usual.
Regression (iv) runs the same regression except it includes an interaction between the
foreign claims ratio and the crisis dummy to test whether the effect of the foreign claims ratio
changes in the midst of the financial crisis and subsequent turbulence in the euro zone. This
regression finds foreign claims and foreign claims during the crisis to be significant and the sign
of the foreign claims ratio to be negative, both of which disagree with the main results and
hypothesis. The relative surplus-to-GDP and securities issued ratio are also significant while the
VIX index and crisis dummy lose their significance, contrary to the main regression. Overall,
the results of the pooled regressions seem ambiguous regarding the effect of foreign claims on
bond yield spreads, but corroborate the importance of a country’s debt-to-GDP in determining
bond yield spreads. Results also suggest the importance of a country’s surplus-to-GDP and
securities issued ratio in that determination. The next section will discuss the conclusions drawn
from the above analyses.
VII. Conclusion
In this study I seek to determine whether a euro zone country’s commercial banks’
foreign claims affect the yields of that country’s long-term bonds. My hypothesis is that higher
levels of foreign claims would increase a country’s bond yields relative to Germany, a country
which is considered relatively risk free in the euro zone. To measure the affect, if any, of foreign
claims on bond yields, I structured the dependent variable as the spread between the German 10year government bond yield and other euro zone countries’ 10-year government bond yields.
From the analysis, foreign claims do not have a significant effect on bond yield spreads,
accounting for other theoretical determinants such as relative debt-to-GDP. Although in only a
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few cases of robustness checks is the foreign claims ratio significant, the sign is almost always
negative, which suggests that even if there were a relationship between foreign claims and yields
in the euro zone, it would not be a positive one as I hypothesized. The debt-to-GDP is the most
persistently significant variable and suggests that increases in a euro zone country’s debt-to-GDP
relative to Germany will increase its government bond yields relative to Germany’s. Another
strong determinant is the VIX volatility index, although the effect is not as consistent.
This investigation contributes to the literature by following the direction of Gerlach et al
(2011) in considering the importance of financial markets in public finance and bond yield
determination. Although the results disprove the hypothesis, the literature now has robust
evidence that a banking sector’s foreign claims do not influence the yields of their host
government’s bonds.
There are several important shortcomings of this analysis and the results it produces.
Many bond yield investigations rely on data of monthly or even daily frequency, which was not
available to me in this analysis. Secondly, studies often will include more than one control
variable for liquidity and risk aversion, but the data were not available on the additional variables
the literature suggests for this study. The time frame of this study is heavily biased by the effects
of the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent turmoil in euro zone financial markets.
To improve upon this study, there are several directions future research could take. First,
the study could be divided in two, where data during and after the crisis at a higher frequency
could be used to analyze in more depth what variables affect bond yields in each economic
environment. Second, another study could attempt to estimate yields directly without the
framework of a spread comparison with Germany and with a different theoretical approach to
yield estimation, such as including the financial sector variables of Gerlach et al (2010). This
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broader theoretical approach could be brought to data covering more countries and periods to
investigate why U.S yields are relatively low. Third, other measures may exist besides
commercial banks foreign claims to measure the affects of a financial contagion on sovereign
bond yields, such as the foreign claims of the national governments themselves. Last, this
research did find a consistent negative, though insignificant, relationship between the yield
spread and foreign claims. With a more complete theory and more frequently recorded data,
perhaps this relationship could be conclusively determined and quantified.
Before the 2008 financial crisis the European Union has tried to impose greater fiscal
discipline on euro zone members to promote stability and growth and prevent runaway fiscal
insolvency and sovereign default in its financially weakest members. One challenge countries
have faced throughout the crisis to the present is difficulty in raising revenues financed by bond
issuance. Based on this investigation’s results, limiting a country’s debt-to-GDP should indeed
be an effective policy for the European Union to maintain in order to reduce bond yield spreads
in the euro zone and promote economic harmony and stability.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Independent Variable
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Bond Yield Spread
304 0.512
0.960
-0.57
8.43
Foreign Claims to Total Ratio
304 0.712
0.190
11.43321 90.20201
Relative Surplus-to-GDP
304 -1.277
6.030
-34.311
12.27061
Relative Debt-to-GDP
304 21.477 27.980
-20.979
103.436
Securities Issued Ratio
304 0.094
0.092
0
34.53159
VIX Index
304 21.003
9.621
11.19
51.723
Crisis Dummy (2008:4)
304 0.362
0.481
0
1
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics, BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics,
OECD StatExtracts, ECB Statistical Warehouse, CBOE.

Table 2: Main Results for Bond Yield Spread
Independent Variable
Foreign Claims to Total Ratio
-0.00368
(0.00354)
Relative Surplus to GDP
-0.00185
(0.00221)
Relative Debt-to-DGP
0.0599*
(0.0341)
Securities Issued Ratio
0.00354
(0.00389)
VIX Index
0.00625**
(0.00250)
Crisis Dummy (2008:3)
0.139**
(0.0593)
Constant
0.0187
(0.0399)
Observations
276
Number of Countries
11
R-squared-Within
0.121
R-squared-Between
0.3196
R-squared-Overall
0.1222
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All variables are their first difference except for
Relative Debt-to-GDP, which is a second difference.
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Table 3: Difference Estimation Robustness Analysis
Regression Coefficients
Independent Variable
(i)
(ii)
Foreign Claims to Total Ratio
Relative Surplus to GDP
Relative Debt-to-DGP
Securities Issued Ratio
VIX Index
Crisis Dummy (2008:3)
Constant

-0.00368
-0.00391
(0.00354)
(0.00347)
-0.00185
-0.00187
(0.00221)
(0.00217)
0.0599*
0.0564*
(0.0341)
(0.0337)
0.00354
0.00358
(0.00389)
(0.00382)
0.00625** 0.00655***
(0.00250)
(0.00247)
0.139**
(0.0593)
0.0187
0.0752**
(0.0399)
(0.0347)
276
276
11
11
0.121
0.0589
0.3196
0.8013
0.1222
0.0636

Observations
Number of Countries
R-squared-Within
R-squared-Between
R-squared-Overall
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: All variables are a first difference except Relative
Debt-to-GDP, which is a second difference. (i) Main results,
(ii) Crisis Dummy removed.
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Independent Variable

Table 4: Fixed Effects Robustness Analyses
Regression Coefficients
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

Foreign Claims to Total Ratio
Relative Surplus to GDP
Relative Surplus to GDP Squared
Relative Debt-to-DGP
Relative Debt-to-GDP Squared
Securities Issued Ratio
Log of Securities Issued Ratio
VIX Index
Crisis Dummy (2008:3)
Constant

-0.00368
-0.00565
0.0102
(0.00354) (0.00473) (0.0253)
-0.00185
-0.00171
-0.0243
(0.00221) (0.00307) (0.0178)
0.0599*
0.150***
0.0790*
(0.0341)
(0.0120)
(0.0418)
0.00354
0.00273
0.0209
(0.00389) (0.00499) (0.0293)
0.00625** 0.0115*** 0.0293*
(0.00250) (0.00293) (0.0164)
0.139**
-0.177*
0.876*
(0.0593)
(0.0988)
(0.479)
0.0187
-2.366*** -6.230***
(0.0399)
(0.0660)
(0.774)
276
293
293
11
11
11
0.121
0.3996
0.082
0.3196
0.2831
0.2141
0.1222
0.1399
0.2065

(v)

-0.00640
0.0000
(0.00431)
(0.0024)
-0.000834
-0.0096
(0.00334)
(0.0115)
0.000403**
(0.000188)
0.0787***
-0.0018
(0.0119)
(0.0022)
0.000900***
(0.000106)
0.0026
(0.0031)
-0.0316***
(0.0115)
0.0128***
0.0011
(0.00273)
(0.0043)
-0.143
(0.0882)
-1.950***
0.3410***
(0.0878)
(0.0796)
293
183
11
11
0.5878
0.0119
0.3738
0.2536
0.2009
0.1007

Observations
Number of Countries
R-squared-Within
R-squared-Between
R-squared-Overall
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: (i) Main Results, variables in first or second (if Relative Debt-to-GDP) difference, (ii) robust
fixed effects, (iii) robust fixed effects using log of bond yield spread, (iv) robust fixed effects with
relative debt and deficit ratios squared, log of securities issued ratio, (v) robust fixed effects precrisis subsample.
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Table 5: Random Effects and Pooled Estimation Robustness Analyses
Regression Coefficients
Independent Variable
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
Foreign Claims to Total Ratio
-0.00368 -0.00944*
-0.00217
0.00616***
(0.00354) (0.00499)
(0.00156)
(0.00168)
Total Foreign Claims Ratio * Crisis
0.0122***
(0.00373)
Relative Surplus to GDP
-0.00185
-0.00535 -0.0382*** -0.0408***
(0.00221) (0.00351)
(0.0130)
(0.0130)
Relative Debt-to-DGP
0.0599* 0.0507*** 0.00974*** 0.00950***
(0.0341)
(0.00679)
(0.00346)
(0.00338)
Securities Issued Ratio
0.00354
0.000929 -0.0168*** -0.0168***
(0.00389) (0.00560)
(0.00425)
(0.00425)
VIX Index
0.00625** 0.0105***
-0.00747
-0.00801
(0.00250) (0.00339)
(0.00655)
(0.00659)
Crisis Dummy (2008:3)
0.139**
0.0744
0.763***
-0.106
(0.0593)
(0.109)
(0.178)
(0.211)
Constant
0.0187
-0.00228
0.447**
0.746***
(0.0399)
(0.443)
(0.180)
(0.196)
Observations
276
304
304
304
Number of Countries
11
11
R-squared-Within
0.121
0.6038
R-squared-Between
0.3196
0.2354
R-squared-Overall
0.1222
0.1616
0.375
0.388
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: (i) Main Results, variables in first or second (if Relative Debt-to-GDP) difference,
(ii) robust random effects, (iii) robust pooled regression, (iv) robust pooled regression
with interaction.
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